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Abstract
In a party-based election system, the voters are grouped
into parties and all voters of a party are assumed to vote
according to the party preferences over the candidates.
Hence, once the party preferences are declared the out-
come of the election can be determined. However, in
the actual election, the members of some “instable” par-
ties often leave their own party to join other parties. We
introduce two parameters to measure the credibility of
the prediction based on party preferences: MIN is the
minimum number of voters leaving the instable parties
such that the prediction is no longer true, while MAX
is the maximum number of voters leaving the instable
parties such that the prediction remains valid. Concern-
ing the complexity of computing MIN and MAX, we
consider both positional scoring rules (Plurality, Veto,
r-Approval and Borda) and Condorcet-consistent rules
(Copeland and Maximin). We show that for all consid-
ered scoring rules, MIN is polynomial-time computable,
while it is NP-hard to compute MIN for Copeland and
Maximin. With the only exception of Borda, MAX can
be computed in polynomial time for other scoring rules.
We have NP-hardness results for the computation of
MAX under Borda, Maximin and Copeland.
Introduction
Voting has been recognized as a common approach for pref-
erence aggregation and collective decision making when-
ever there exists more than one alternative for a com-
munity to choose from. Based on the conflicting prefer-
ences over the alternatives of different voters, some vot-
ing rules are designed in an effort to reach the best possi-
ble joint decision. Since long, voting has been a part and
parcel of the fields of preference handling, decision mak-
ing and social choice. It comes with a wide variety of ap-
plications which ranges from multi-agent systems, politi-
cal elections, recommendation systems, etc. (Pitt et al. 2006;
Popescu 2013).
By the celebrated Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
(Gibbard 1973; Satterthwaite 1975) and other results
expanding its score (see, e.g, the work by Duggan and
Schwarthz (Duggan and Schwartz 2000)) all reasonable
voting systems are manipulable in principle, as long as
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they are not restricted to extremely special cases, e.g., the
single-peaked restriction. This gives rise to the possibility
for voters to misreport their preferences in order to get
better off. Motivated by this fact, Bartholdi, Tovey and Trick
(Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick 1989) initiated the study of this
issue from the complexity theoretic aspect with the adoption
of computational complexity shields as the natural barrier to
prevent instability of voting. Their seminal work paved the
path for huge amount of research work exploring the com-
plexity of various strategic behaviors (e.g., manipulation,
control, bribery) in voting systems which has been exten-
sively studied in the past two decades (Parkes and Xia 2012;
Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra 2013;
Chevaleyre et al. 2007).
In this paper, we study the voting systems, where voters
can be grouped into parties (or interest groups) and the party
members are required to follow party discipline, that is, the
voters of the same party should all vote according to the
party preference. In this setting, the outcome of the voting
can be easily predicted, once the preferences of all parties
are declared. Such voting scenarios can be found in various
real-world applications, for example, parliament voting and
board elections of universities.
However, in practice, the final results of such elections
are often much different from the predictions based on party
preferences, mainly caused by the “instability” of some par-
ticipating parties. That is, some members of these “ instable”
parties refuse to follow the preferences of their own par-
ties and join other “stable” parties, possibly persuaded by
the stable parties. Thus, it could be of great importance for
the chairman of the voting to measure the influence of the
instable parties to the predictability of the voting. Hereby,
consider the following two parameters: MIN represents the
minimum number of voters from the instable parties, who
can change the outcome of the voting by joining other stable
parties, and MAX represents the maximum number of vot-
ers from the instable parties, whose revoting will not affect
the outcome. Based on these definitions the prediction of
such a party-based voting with high values of both MIN and
MAX can be considered as credible. These two parameters
could be also critical for party leaders to design their strategy
for manipulating the outcome of the election. For example,
for a party fearing an unfavorable prediction, the parameter
MIN indicates the minimum “budget” that the party needs
to invest, that is, to persuade how many voters from insta-
ble parties, while the minimum goal for the parties favoring
the prediction is to have |V|-MAX voters obeying their own
party preferences, where V is the set of all voters.
The main task of this work is to explore the computa-
tional complexity of computing MIN and MAX for various
voting rules. We show that MIN is polynomial-time com-
putable for all common positional scoring rules and for Con-
dorcet, but NP-hard for Maximin and Copeland. Moreover,
the computation of Max can be done in polynomial-time for
r-Approval, Plurality and Veto, but is NP-hard for Borda,
Condorcet, Maximin and Copeland. To this end, we mainly
study a variation of the above mentioned party-based elec-
tion, where there is only one stable party, that is, the mem-
bers of the instable parties can only join this stable party.
This variation could be of particular interest for one partic-
ipating party to determine how hard it is to manipulate or
defend the outcome of the voting by persuading members of
other parties to join it.
Related Works
Perek et al. (Perek et al. 2013) also considered the party-
based elections, where there is a “leading” party with a fa-
vorable prediction. The main goal is to calculate how safe
is the leading party with respect to losing its members to
other parties. Hereby, Perek et al. also compute two param-
eters, the minimum number of members to lose to change
the outcome (PES) and the maximum number of members
to lose without changing the outcome (OPT). The model by
Perek et al. shares certain similarities with ours, distinguish-
ing stable and instable parties and voters switching from
instable to stable parties. Thus, our work without restric-
tion on the number of “instable” parties can be considered
as complementing and extending the one by Perek et al.
(Perek et al. 2013), where there is only one fixed instable
party. The difference between our problems and the ones
of Perek et al. (Perek et al. 2013) consists mainly in the par-
ties whose voters may switch. Perek et al. (Perek et al. 2013)
fixed one party as the winning party and all the switching of
voters takes place from this party to other parties. However,
in our problems the voters from any party can switch to any
other party without any such restrictions. Besides this, the
motivation of our work is significantly different from that
of theirs. Our model puts strong emphasis on the stability
of the election as a whole, and the instability could make
some parties better off or worse off. This issue is within the
compass of the voting rule designer. However, their work
measures the stability related to a fixed party leader (the
leader of the fixed party which is assumed to be known be-
fore performing the strategic behavior). Moreover, although
the complexity results of our problems seem very similar
to the ones achieved by Perek et al. (Perek et al. 2013), the
complexity results of one model cannot be inferred from that
of the other. From the technical point of view, our reductions
are based on completely different reduction strategies com-
pared to Perek et al. (Perek et al. 2013).
Our study has clear connection to the bribery problem
(Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra 2009),
where voters may be bribed to change their votes in any
possible way to influence the voting outcome. In contrast,
we consider party-based elections, where voters can only
switch from party to party and follow the party preferences,
which could be more realistic in many settings.
Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce some basic notions which
we use throughout this paper. More detailed defini-
tions and results about voting theory can be found in
(Betzler et al. 2012). An election is a pair E = (C,V), where
C = {c1, . . . , cm} is a set of candidates and V =
{v1, . . . , vn} is a set of voters. Each voter casts a prefer-
ence over C. A preference is a linear order that ranks the
candidates from the most preferred one to the least preferred
one. For example, if C = {a, b, c} and some voter likes a
best, then b, and then c, then his or her preference is repre-
sented as a ≻ b ≻ c. For two distinct candidates c and d,
we define NE(c, d) as the number of voters in E who prefer
c to d. We omit the index E if it is clear from the context.
We say a candidate c beats (resp. ties) another candidate c′
if N(c, c′) > N(c′, c) (resp. N(c, c′) = N(c′, c)).
A voting rule is a function R that given an election
E = (C,V) returns a subset R(E) ⊆ C of the candidates that
are said to win the election.
In this paper, we consider the following voting rules. An
m-candidate positional scoring rule is defined through a
non-increasing vector α = (α1, . . . , αm) of non-negative
integers. A candidate c ∈ C is assigned αi points from
each voter that ranks c in the ith position of his prefer-
ence. The score of a candidate is the sum of points he gets
from all voters. The candidate(s) with the maximum score
are the winner(s). Many election rules can be considered
as positional scoring rules. We study the following scoring
rules (form candidates) in this paper: Plurality (scoring vec-
tor (1, 0, . . . , 0)), Veto (scoring vector (1, 1, . . . , 1, 0)), r-
Approval (scoring vector with r ones followed by m − r
zeroes, and Borda (scoring vector (m− 1,m− 2, . . . , 0)).
A Condorcet-consistent rule always elects the Condorcet
winner, if it exists. The Condorcet winner is the candidate
who beats all other candidates. Examples of Condorcet-
consistent rules, that will be considered in this paper, are
Maximin and Copeland. For a candidate c in an election,
let B(c) be the set of candidates which are beat by c and
let T (c) be the set of candidates which tie with c. Then, the
Copelandα score of c is |B(c)|+α · |T (c)|, for 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. A
candidate is a Copelandα winner if it has the highest score.
On the other hand, the maximin score of a candidate c is
given by mind∈C\{c}NE(c, d), and the winner in a maximin
election is a candidate with the highest score.
We consider the election scenario where voters are
grouped into parties. That is, in addition to the set of vot-
ers V = (v1, . . . , vn) we have a partition P = (P1, . . . , Pl)
of voters, where P1, . . . , Pl are called parties. We assume
that all voters in the same party vote in the same way, called
the preference of the party. An election with parties is there-
fore represented as a triple E = (C,V ,P). When we say that
a voter switches from its original party to another party, we
mean that the respective voter casts his vote according to
the preference of the destination party. We mainly study the
variation, where there is only one stable party, called one
destination model. Here, the members of the only stable
party cannot switch to other parties. The two problems con-
sidered in this paper are defined as follows. Note that both
problems have a distinguished candidate p, who is the win-
ner of the election, if all voters follow their party preference.
ONE-DESTINATION-MIN
Input: An election with parties E = {C,V ,P}, a positive
integer k, a distinguished candidate p and a specific voting
rule.
Question: Is there one party P such that another candidate
p′ 6= p becomes the winner after at most k voters not in P
switching to P ?
ONE-DESTINATION-MAX
Input: An election with parties E = {C,V ,P}, a positive
integer k, a distinguished candidate p and a specific voting
rule
Question: Is there one partyP such that p remains the win-
ner after at least k voters not in P switching to P ?
Similarly, we can define MULTIPLE-DESTINATION-MIN
and MULTIPLE-DESTINATION-MAX where the number of
the destination parties is not restricted.
Our hardness proofs are reduced from the following prob-
lems:
EXACT THREE SET COVER (X3C)
Input: A set X = {x1, . . . , xm}, and a collection S =
{S1, . . . , Sn} of 3-element subsets of X .
Question: Does S have an exact cover S for X , i.e., a sub-
collection S ⊆ S such that every element of X occurs in
exactly one subset of S ?
Throughout this paper, we assume that each element xi oc-
curs in exactly three subsets of S. This assumption does not
change the NP-hardness of X3C (Gonzalez 1985).
An independent set of a graph is a subset of vertices where
no edge exists between any pair of vertices in this subset. A
vertex cover of a graph is a subset of vertices whose removal
results in an independent set.
INDEPENDENT SET (IS)
Input: A graph G and an integer t ≥ 0.
Question: Is there an independent set of G of size at
least t?
VERTEX COVER (VC)
Input: A graph G and an integer t ≥ 0.
Question: Is there a vertex cover of G of size at most t?
X3C, VERTEX COVER and INDEPENDENT SET are
known to be NP-complete (Garey and Johnson 1979).
Remarks: Our results hold for both unique-winner and
nonunique-winner models, and also for both one-destination
and multiple-destination cases. Here, for the sake of simplic-
ity, all our proofs are for the one-destination with the unique-
winner model. Other combinations can be shown by slightly
modifying the proofs given here.
Election The complexity of computing
systems MIN MAX
Plurality P P
Veto P P
r-Approval P P
Borda P NP-h
Condorcet P NP-h
Maximin NP-h NP-h
Copelandα NP-h NP-h
Table 1: Summary of Our Results
The Complexity of Computing MIN
In this section, we study the ONE-DESTINATION-MIN
problems. In particular, we prove that these problems are
polynomial-time solvable under all positional scoring rules.
As for the Condorcet-consistent rules, we prove that the
Condorcet rule behaves in the same way as the positional
scoring rules, whereas both the Maximin voting and the
Copelandα voting for all 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 lead to NP-hardness
in the ONE-DESTINATION-MIN problem. Our main results
are summarized in the following theorems.
Theorem 1 ONE-DESTINATION-MIN for all positional
scoring rules is polynomial-time solvable.
PROOF. We prove the theorem by proposing an algo-
rithm which runs in polynomial time. Without loss of gen-
erality, let ~α = (α1, α2, ..., αm) be the scoring vector where
α1 ≥ α2 ≥, ...,≥ αm. In the first step of our algorithm we
guess the replacing candidate p′ which will have a score at
least that of p after some voters switch their parties. Clearly,
our guess involves candidates only from C\{p}whose num-
ber is bounded by m − 1. Then, for each such guess p′, we
need to check if it is possible to make p′ have a score at
least that of p by switching at most k voters possibly from
several parties to a certain destination party in P . The best
possible way of decreasing the gap between the scores of p
and p′ with switching the minimum number of voters is to
fix a party, whose preference achieves the maximum value
of s≻(p′) − s≻(p), as the destination. Here, ≻ denotes the
preference of the party and s≻(c) denotes the score of the
candidate c from ≻. Now, we sort the party preferences of
the remaining parties according to the non-increasing order
of s≻(p)− s≻(p′). Finally, we switch the voters of the party
ordered at the first place, then the one at the second place,
and so on to the destination party, until k voters are switched
or the score of p′ is at least that of p. If the latter case applies,
we return “yes”; otherwise, we return “no”. The correctness
and running time of the algorithm are easy to prove.
Theorem 2 ONE-DESTINATION-MIN for the Condorcet
voting rule is solvable in polynomial time.
PROOF. Again, the algorithm first guesses the candidate
p′ which beats p in the final election. Next, it fixes one party,
whose party preference prefers p′ to p, as the destination
party. Then, it switches arbitrary k voters, which prefer p to
p′, to the destination party and checks the final winning sta-
tus of p and p′. For each guessed candidate, the switch of
voters and the calculation of scores can be done in polyno-
mial time, and with at most m− 1 such guesses we have an
overall polynomial-time algorithm.
Theorem 3 ONE-DESTINATION-MIN for the Copelandα
voting rule is NP-hard, for every 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
PROOF. We reduce an instance G = (V,E) of VERTEX
COVER with |V | = n to an instance E = (C,V ,P) of ONE-
DESTINATION-MIN. Clearly, VERTEX COVER remains NP-
hard with t < n−52 . Without loss of generality, assume n
being even. We further assume that there exist two vertices
v′ and v′′ in V , which do not belong to some solution set
(e.g., both v and v′ have degree-1). Both assumptions do not
change the NP-hardness of VERTEX COVER.
For each edge ei ∈ E, we create a corresponding candi-
date in C. With slight abuse of terminology, we use the same
notation to denote the candidate as its corresponding edge in
E. Let E(v) be the set of candidates corresponding to the
edges containing the vertex v and E∗ be the set of all candi-
dates corresponding to the edges in E. In addition, we have
six candidates p,A = {a1, a2} and B = {b1, b2, b3}. In all
the following preferences, we assume an order (a1 ≻ a2) for
A and an order (b1 ≻ b2 ≻ b3) for B. In the following pref-
erences, the elements of some subset E′ ⊆ E∗ are ordered
consecutively. Hereby, we use . . . ≻ E′ ≻ . . . to denote the
suborder formed by E′ and the elements in E′ are assumed
to be ordered in this suborder according to their indices. We
first create the following two preferences:
E(v′) ≻ A ≻ p ≻ B ≻ E∗ \ E(v′) and
E(v′′) ≻ A ≻ p ≻ B ≻ E∗ \ E(v′′).
In addition, for every other vertex v ∈ V \ {v′, v′′}, we
create a preference defined as follows:
E(v) ≻ p ≻ B ≻ A ≻ E∗ \E(v)
Each of the above preferences represents a party. We de-
note by Pv the party corresponding to the vertex v. Further-
more, we have a party P containing one voter with the fol-
lowing preference:
B ≻ E∗ ≻ p ≻ A.
Finally, we have n − 2 voters, out of which the first n−22
voters form a party denoted by P1 with the preference:
a1 ≻ p ≻ a2 ≻ E
∗ ≻ B.
The other n−22 voters form a party denoted by P2 with the
following preference:
E∗ ≻ B ≻ a1 ≻ p ≻ a2.
Finally, set k = t. Before discussing the correctness, con-
sider the score of each candidate first. For a candidate c, let
s(c) be the Copelandα score of c. Then we have
s(p) = |E|+ 4,
s(a1) = |E|+ 2,
s(a2) = |E|,
s(bi) = 5− i, where i = 1, 2, 3, and
s(ei) = |E| − i+ 3.
It is clear that p is the current winner. Some useful obser-
vations are as follows:
Claim 1 The following claims hold:
(1) s(p) cannot be decreased by switching at most k vot-
ers.
(2) s(ai), s(ei) cannot be increased by switching at most
k voters.
(3) Switching of at most k voters can increase s(b1) to at
most |E|+ 4.
PROOF. (1) Since for every ei ∈ E∗ we have
N(p, ei) − N(ei, p) = n − 5, and for every bi ∈ B, we
have N(p, bi)−N(bi, p) = n− 1, with the assumption that
t < n−52 , switching arbitrary k = t voters can never de-
crease the score of p.
(2) Similar to (1).
(3) Observe that N(ei, b1) − N(b1, ei) = 1 for every
ei ∈ E
∗
. Therefore, b1 has the potential to beat every ei:
just switch one voter of a party with ei ≻ b1 to a party with
b1 ≻ ei. Therefore, b1 has the potential to have a score of
|E| + 4. However, since N(p, b1) − N(b1, p) = n − 1, b1
has no chance to increase its score furthermore. .
Now we prove that G has a vertex cover of size at most
t, if and only if ONE-DESTINATION-MIN on E = {C,V ,P}
has a “yes” answer.
(⇒:) Let G have a vertex cover C of size t. Consider
the election after all voters corresponding to C switch to the
party P . Since C is a vertex cover, for every edge ei, there
is at least one vertex v ∈ C with ei ∈ E(v). Therefore, for
every edge ei, at least one voter of a party with preference
ei ≻ b1 is switched to the party P , where b1 ≻ ei. Due to
the analysis of the third claim in Claim 1, b1 beats every ei
and thus p is not the unique winner anymore.
(⇐:) Assume that ONE-DESTINATION-MIN on
E = {C,V ,P} has a “yes” answer and C is the set of
voters which switch to the destination party. Due to Claim
1, the only candidate which could have a score at least that
of p is b1. This can only happen if b1 beats every ei ∈ E∗.
Based on this claim, we observe that the parties P1 and
P2 cannot be the destination party. Among the remaining
parties, it is obvious that P is the best possible destination
party since b1 beats every ei in this party (in other words, if
there is a solution in which the destination party is not P ,
we can always construct another solution with P being the
destination party). Now consider which parties could be the
instable parties. We claim the following.
Claim 2 The voters of P1 and P2 cannot be switched.
To verify the above claim, observe that switching one ar-
bitrary voter from P1 ∪ P2 to P would make b1 reach its
highest possible score |E|+ 4. However, this also increases
the score of p by one (from beating a1); thus p remains the
winner.
Now we show that the vertices corresponding to the vot-
ers in C must be a vertex cover in G. Due to the above
analysis, b1 has a score at least that of p, only if b1 beats
every ei ∈ E∗. Therefore, for every edge ei, there must
be at least one voter in C corresponding to a vertex v with
ei ∈ E(v), implying the vertices corresponding to C form a
vertex cover of G.
Theorem 4 ONE-DESTINATION-MIN for Maximin is NP-
hard.
Due to space limitation, the proof is deferred to the Ap-
pendix.
The Complexity of Computing MAX
In this section, we prove the polynomial-time solvability
of ONE-DESTINATION-MAX for Plurality, r-Approval and
Veto rules and present NP-hardness results of the same prob-
lem for Borda, Condorcet, Maximin and Copeland rules.
Theorem 5 ONE-DESTINATION-MAX for Plurality, r-
Approval with constant r and Veto voting rules are
polynomial-time solvable.
PROOF. We consider here only r-Approval. The cases with
Plurality and Veto can be handled similarly. Our polynomial-
time algorithm first guesses the destination party among all
the parties in the given instance E = (C,V ,P). Among the
total of |V| such guesses, we discard those with preferences
which do not approve p. For each remaining guessed desti-
nation parties we do the following.
Let C ⊆ C be the set of r candidates which are approved
by the preference of the destination party. Since p is the
unique winner, for each candidate c ∈ C \ {p}, there must
exist at least one voter disapproving c in the original elec-
tion. To maintain p as the unique winner, for each candidate
c ∈ C\{p}, there must be at least one voter disapproving c in
the original election and this voter cannot be switched to the
destination party. Therefore, we need to find out a minimum
set of voters together disapproving C \ {p}. Since |C| ≤ r
and r is a constant, this set can be found in polynomial time.
Theorem 6 ONE-DESTINATION-MAX for the Borda rule
is NP-hard.
PROOF. We reduce from X3C. Let (X =
{x1, x2, ..., xm},S = {S1, S2, ..., Sn}) be an instance of
X3C.
We have in total m + 6 candidates. More precisely, for
each xi ∈ X , we have a corresponding candidate. For sim-
plicity, we will use the same notation xi to denote the cor-
responding candidate. In addition, we have six other candi-
dates p, d1, d2, d3, y, z. We create party preferences as fol-
lows.
Let −→X be the order of the elements in X according
to the increasing order of their indices. For each subset
{xi, xj , xk} ∈ S with i < j < k, we create one prefer-
ence z ≻
−→
X [xi → d1, xj → d2, xk → d3] ≻ p ≻ xi ≻
xj ≻ xk ≻ y. Here
−→
X [xi → d1, xj → d2, xk → d3] is the
linear order obtained from −→X with replacing xi, xj , xk by
d1, d2, d3, respectively. The corresponding party is denoted
by P(i,j,k) and has only one voter.
Next, we create one party P ′ with n voters and the pref-
erence:
y ≻ p ≻
←−
X ≻ z ≻ d1 ≻ d2 ≻ d3, where
←−
X is the reverse
order of−→X . Additionally, we create a party P with one voter
and the following preference:
−→
X ≻ p ≻ d1 ≻ d2 ≻ d3 ≻ y ≻ z.
It is clear that p is the current winner. More precisely,
s(p)−s(z) = 5, s(p)−s(y) = 3n+4 and s(p)−s(xi) > 0.
Here, s(c) denotes the Borda score of c. We claim that an ex-
act 3-set cover exists if and only if n−m/3 voters can switch
their parties to a party such that p is still the winner.
Suppose that there is an exact 3-set cover S for (X,S).
Then leave all the parties corresponding to S and the party
P ′ unchanged, and switch all the other voters into the party
P . It is easy to check that p is still the winner.
For the reverse direction, we first claim that only P can
be the destination party if the constructed instance is a true-
instance. P ′ cannot be the destination party, since otherwise,
y would become the winner. P(i,j,k) cannot be the destina-
tion party, since otherwise, either z or some xi would be-
come the winner. This completes the proof of claim. We fur-
ther claim that the party P ′ cannot be instable. This is true,
since otherwise, some xi would have a higher score than that
of p. Now suppose that there is no exact 3-set cover. Then
there must be an xi such that after switching n−m/3 voters
from ∪i,j,kP(i,j,k) to the party P , all the remaining voters in
the parties P(i,j,k) prefer xi to p. This results in xi having a
greater score than that of p, and thus p cannot be the unique
winner anymore.
Theorem 7 ONE-DESTINATION-MAX for the Condorcet
voting rule is NP-hard.
PROOF. We give a reduction from an X3C-instance (X,S)
to an instance E = {C,V ,P} of ONE-DESTINATION-MAX.
The candidate set is C = X∪A∪B∪C∪D∪{p}, whereA =
{a1, a2, a3, a4} , B = {b1, b2, b3, b4}, C = {c1, c2, ..., cn}
and D = {d1, d2, ..., dn}. The set X contains a candidate
for each element in X . Hence, there are totally 2n + m +
9 candidates. For a set U with elements u1, u2, ..., ut, we
denote by −→U the order (u1 ≻ u2 ≻ . . . ≻ ut) and by
←−
U
the reverse order of −→U . Moreover, for two elements ui, uj
with i < j, we use −→U [ui, uj ] to denote the suborder (ui ≻
ui+1 ≻ . . . ≻ uj). We assume a fixed order (S1 ≻ S2 ≻
. . . ≻ Sn) for the subsets in S. We create two preferences
for each St ∈ S with St = {xi, xj , xk}:
1. −→D [dt+1, dn] ≻
−→
C [c1, ct] ≻
−→
A ≻ xi ≻ xj ≻ xk ≻
p ≻
−→
X \ St ≻
←−
B ≻
−→
C [ct+1, cn] ≻
−→
D [d1, dt]. The corre-
sponding party denoted by Pt, has only one voter.
2. −→D [d1, dt] ≻
−→
C [ct+1, cn] ≻
−→
B ≻
←−
X \ St ≻ p ≻
xk ≻ xj ≻ xi ≻
←−
A ≻
−→
C [c1, ct] ≻
−→
D [dt+1, dn]. The
corresponding party, denoted by P ′t , has only one voter.
Next, we construct additional preferences as follows, each
representing a party of its own. Each of the parties has only
one voter.
a1 ≻ b1 ≻ p ≻
−→
X ≻
−→
A \ {a1} ≻
−→
B \ {b1} ≻
−→
C ≻
−→
D ;
the corresponding party is denoted by P¯1
a2 ≻ b2 ≻ p ≻
←−
X ≻
−→
A \ {a2} ≻
−→
B \ {b2} ≻
←−
C ≻
←−
D ;
the corresponding party is denoted by P¯2
a3 ≻ b3 ≻ p ≻
−→
X ≻
−→
A \ {a3} ≻
−→
B \ {b3} ≻
−→
C ≻
−→
D ;
the corresponding party is denoted by P¯3.
a4 ≻ b4 ≻ p ≻
←−
X ≻
−→
A \ {a4} ≻
−→
B \ {b4} ≻
←−
C ≻
←−
D ;
the corresponding party is denoted by P¯4.
−→
X ≻ p ≻
−→
A ∪
−→
B ≻
−→
C ≻
−→
D ; the corresponding party is
denoted by P .
In total, we have 2n+ 5 voters. Now we arrive at the cor-
rectness proof of the reduction.
(⇒:) Clearly, p beats every other candidate and thus is the
current winner. Suppose that (X,S) has an exact 3-set cover
S. We claim that after switching all the voters in the parties
P ′t , which correspond to the subsets in S, to the party P , p
will still be the winner. Observe that p beats every candidate
in C ∪ D ∪ A ∪ B in the final election. Since S is an exact
3-set cover, for each x ∈ X there is exactly one party P ′t
in the solution preferring p to x. Even though the party P
prefers x to p, p still beats x by n+ 3. The claim follows.
(⇐:) Suppose that we switch a set S′ of m/3 voters to
a particular party in P such that p remains the Condorcet
winner. We claim the following:
Claim 3 No P¯i, where i = 1, 2, 3, 4, can be the destination
party.
PROOF. Due to the symmetry, we only need to give the
proof for the party P¯1. All other cases are similar. Observe
that all parties other than P¯1 prefer p to either a1 or b1, or
both. Since there are n + 1 parties preferring a to p in the
original election, switching any arbitrary five voters to the
party P¯1 will make a1 or b1 beat p, contradicting with the
fact that p is the Condorcet winner in the final election.
Claim 4 None of Pt and P ′t can be the destination party, for
all t ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}.
PROOF. Due to the symmetry, we only need to give the
proof for Pt for a certain t. Suppose that this is not true and
we have switched a set S′ of m/3 voters to the party Pt,
whereSt = {xi, xj , xk}, without changing the winning can-
didate. There is at most one voter in S′ which is not from the
parties
⋃
z∈{1,...,n} Pz , since otherwise, some ai would beat
p, contradicting that p is the Condorcet winner. Therefore, at
least m/3 − 1 voters of S′ are from
⋃
z∈{1,...,n} Pz . More-
over, at most two voters of S′ are from
⋃
z>t Pz , since other-
wise, dt would beat p. Symmetrically, at most two voters of
S are from
⋃
z<t Pz (otherwise, ct would beat p), implying
that |S′| ≤ 5, a contradiction.
Due to the above two claims, the only possible destination
party is P . We further claim the following facts.
Claim 5 None of the parties P¯i can be instable, where i =
1, 2, 3, 4.
PROOF. Observe that p beats every xi by n+4. Therefore,
if we switch some voter in P¯i to the party P , then no other
voter can be switched to P , since every voter not in the party
P prefers p to some xi. The claim follows.
Claim 6 None of the parties Pt can be instable for t ∈
{1, 2, ..., n}.
PROOF. Suppose that we switch some voter in a certain
party Pt to P , where St = {xi, xj , xk}. Due to Claim 5,
no voter is switched from
⋃
z P¯z to P . Besides, at most one
voter in
⋃
z P
′
z∪Pz \{Pt} can be switched to P , since other-
wise, some xi would beat p, contradicting that |S′| = m/3.
According to the above claims, the instable parties can
only be from S′ ⊆
⋃
z∈{1,2,...,n} P
′
z . Since p beats every
x ∈ X by n + 1, at most one voter in S′ prefer p to p,
implying that the subsets corresponding to S′, that is S =
{{xi, xj , xk} | ∃t, P
′
t ∈ S
′ and St = {xi, xj , xk}}, form
an exact 3-set cover.
Theorem 8 ONE-DESTINATION-MAX for the Maximin
rule is NP-hard.
Next we show that ONE-DESTINATION-MAX remains
hard for the Copeland voting rule.
Theorem 9 ONE-DESTINATION-MAX for Copelandα is
NP-hard, for every 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
Due to space limitation, the proofs for the above two the-
orems are deferred to the Appendix.
Conclusion
We examined the election systems with parties. Here, par-
ties can be partitioned into stable and instable parties. Since
members of instable switch to stable parties, the outcome of
the election could be diverse to the prediction made based
on the preferences of the parties. We introduced two pa-
rameters MIN and MAX to measure the credibility of the
prediction of such elections and present a comprehensive
study of the complexity for computing MIN and MAX un-
der the most common positional scoring rules Plurality, r-
Approval, Borda, Veto and three Condorcet-consistent rules
(Condorcet, Maximin, Copeland).
An avenue for possible future research could be to in-
vestigate other variants of the model studied here. For in-
stance, practical applications indicate that the members of
one party can switch only to the parties, which have similar
preferences as their own. More formally, a member of the
party P can switch to another party P ′, only if the ”dis-
tance” between the preferences of P and P ′ is bounded.
Here, the distance measure could be swap-distance, Kendall-
Tau-distance, etc. It could be also of practical interest to as-
sume that the number of members leaving an instable party
is bounded.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 4
PROOF. We give a reduction from an X3C instance (X,S)
to an instance E = {C,V ,P} of ONE-DESTINATION-MIN.
For each x ∈ X , we create a candidate. For convenience,
we still use x to denote the candidate. In addition, we have
four candidates p, z, α and β. For each set St ∈ S with St =
{xi, xj , xk} and i < j < k, create the following preference:
xi ≻ xj ≻ xk ≻ z ≻ p ≻ X \ {xi, xj , xk} ≻ β ≻ α.
This preference represents a party with only one voter.
Next, create n−m3 new voters; the half of them forms one
party with the following preference:
β ≻ α ≻ p ≻
−→
X ≻ z.
The other half has the preference:
α ≻ p ≻
−→
X ≻ z ≻ β.
Let B1, B2, ..., Bm/3 be subsets of X , where Bi =
{x3i−2, x3i−1, x3i}. For each Bi, create two voters forming
two parties with the following two preferences, respectively:
β ≻ α ≻ p ≻ X \Bi ≻ z ≻ Bi.
α ≻ p ≻ X \Bi ≻ z ≻ Bi ≻ β.
Finally, we create a party with one voter and the prefer-
ence: z ≻
−→
X ≻ p ≻ α ≻ β. This party is denoted by
P , which we later prove to be the destination party. Overall,
|C| = m+ 4 and |V| = 2n+ m3 + 1. Next, we calculate the
score of each candidate. In the following, s(c) denotes the
maximin score of the candidate c, and min(c) is the set of
candidates c′, which reach the minimum value of N(c, c′):
s(β) = (n+ m3 )/2 and min (β) = {p, z, xi},
s(α) = (n+ m3 )/2 + 1 and min (α) = {β},
s(p) = n+ 1 and min (p) = {α},
s(z) = n and min (z) = {xi},
s(xi) = 4 and min (xi) = {p}.
Clearly, p is the current winner. Suppose that there is an
exact 3-set cover S. If all the voters corresponding to S
switch to the party P , z would beat every xi by n + 1; and
thus p is not the unique winner anymore. It remains to show
the other direction. Observe that the only candidate, which
could have a score at least that of p is z. Therefore, if n/3
voters switch to some party to make p not the unique win-
ner, the destination party can only be the party P . The in-
stable parties can only be the ones corresponding to S, since
with other parties being instable, the score of p would in-
crease. However, the set corresponding to the voters which
are switched to the destination party must be an exact 3-set
cover, since otherwise, there would exist an xi such that at
most n voters prefer z to xi, resulting in p still being the
winner.
Proof of Theorem 8
PROOF. We give a reduction from INDEPENDENT SET.
Given an instance I = (G, t) of INDEPENDENT SET, where
G = (V,E), E = {e1, . . . , em}, n = |V |, we create an
instance E = (C,V ,P) of ONE-DESTINATION-MAX as fol-
lows.
The candidate set is C = {a, b, p, e1, . . . , em}. Let
−→
E =
(e1 ≻ e2 ≻ . . . ≻ em) be an order of E. We first create a
set Z of n parties corresponding to the vertices in the graph.
More specifically, for each vertex v ∈ V , we create a pref-
erence defined as follows:
a ≻
−−−−−−→
E \ E(v) ≻ p ≻
−−→
E(v) ≻ b.
Each preference represents a party with one voter, denoted
by Pv . Then, we create a party P ′ containing n voters with
the preference:
b ≻ p ≻
←−
E ≻ a.
Finally, we create a party P containing only one voter
with the preference:
−→
E ≻ p ≻ b ≻ a.
Finally, set k = t. Now we prove the correctness of the
reduction. We refer to Table 2 for the comparison of scores
of candidates. It is clear from the table, that p is the current
unique winner as p is preferred to all other candidates by at
least n+ 1 voters.
p b ej(i > j) ej(i < j) a
p - n+ 1 n+ 2 n+ 2 n+ 1
b n - n n n+ 1
ei n− 1 n+ 1 ≥ n ≥ n− 1 n+ 1
a n n n n -
Table 2: Comparisons between candidates in proof of Theo-
rem 8, where the entry in the row of x and the column of y
denotes the number of voters who prefer x to y.
(⇒:) Assume that I is a true-instance and S is an inde-
pendent set of G of size t. Consider the election after k = t
voter corresponding to S switch to the party P . Let Vs be the
set of these k = t voters. It is clear that p beats a and b by
n+1+ k and n+1, respectively. Since S is an independent
set, for each edge ei, there is at most one voter in Vs which
prefers ei to p. Hence, p beats every edge candidate ei by
at least n + 1, implying the maximin score of p is n + 1.
Moreover, the scores of a and b do not increase. It remains
to show that score of every ei still remains less than that of p.
To check this, consider the comparison of the scores of p and
ei. Since S is an independent set, the same reason discussed
above implies that every ei beats p by at most n. Thus, the
maximin score of ei cannot be greater than n, implying that
p still remains the unique winner.
(⇐:) Assume that it is possible to switch a set S′ of k
voters in V from their original parties to the destination party
such that p still remains the winner in the overall election.
We first claim that P ′ cannot be the destination party. It
is easy to see that if P ′ is the destination party, b will be-
come the new winner replacing p. We then distinguish the
following cases:
Case 1. P is the destination. In this case, we can assume
that at most one voter in S′ is from P ′, since otherwise, e1
would replace p as a winner. Assume now that there is ex-
actly one voter of S′ which belongs to the party P ′. Clearly,
all other voters of S′ come from the parties in the set Z .
Since the party P prefers every ei to p, and the parties in the
set Z prefer p to some edge candidates, the score of pwill be
at most n. However, e1 has a score at least n, contradicting
that p is the unique winner. Based on the above fact, it is safe
to assume that all the votes in S′ belong to the parties in the
set Z . We claim now that the vertices corresponding to the
voters of S′ form an independent set. If this is not true, there
must be some edge candidates, each of which is preferred to
p by two voters of S′. Let ei be such an edge candidate with
maximum index i. Consider the election after all the voters
in S′ are switched to the party P . It is clear that ei beats
p, a, b by at least n + 1, and ei beats ej for all j < i by at
least n. Now consider the comparison between some ej with
j > i with ei. Since the voters in the set Z which prefer ej
to ei, are switched to the party P ′ where the voters prefer ei
to ej , all the voters in the set Z and all the voters in the party
P prefer ei to ej , implying that ei beats ej by n + 1. Thus,
we conclude that ei has a final score of n. However, since p
beats ei by n in the final election, p is not the unique winner
anymore.
p ai bi ei ci
p - n+ 1 n+ 1 n+ 2 1
ai n - n+ 1 n n+ 1
bi n n - n n+ 1
ei n− 1 n+ 1 n+ 1 - n− 1
ci 2n n n n+ 2 -
Table 3: Comparison between candidates in the Proof of
Theorem 8, where the entry in the row of x and the column
of y denotes the number of voters who prefer x to y.
Case 2. Now we consider the case that the destination
party is some Pv. Again, we claim that the vertices cor-
responding to S′ form an independent set, if p is still the
unique winner. For the sake of contradiction, assume this is
not true. Then there must be an edge ei = (u,w) with min-
imum index i, such that two voters in S′ are switched to the
party Pv. Note that ei cannot be adjacent to v. Thus, p beats
ei by n, implying that the score of n is at most n. Now con-
sider the score of ei. It is easy to verify that ei beats a, b, p
by n + 1, and beats ej for all j > i by n. Moreover, since
the only two voters in the set Z which prefer ej to ei are
switched to the party Pv , which prefers ei to ej , the score
of ei is at least n. Therefore, p no longer remains the unique
winner, contradicting the assumption.
Proof of Theorem 9
PROOF. We show the NP-hardness by a reduction from
IS. Given an instance I = (G = (V,E), t) of IS where
E = {e′1, . . . , e
′
m}, and n = |V |, we construct the instance
I ′ = (C,V ,P) of ONE-DESTINATION-MAX as follows:
Our candidate set is C = A ∪ B ∪ C ∪ {p} ∪ E∗ where
A = {a1, . . . , am}, B = {b1, . . . , bm}, C = {c1, . . . , cm}
and E∗ contains a candidate for each edge in E. We con-
struct the following set of parties. Here, the elements in A,
B, C and E∗ are ordered according to the indices of the el-
ements.
(1) For each v ∈ V create a party Pv containing one voter
with the preferenceA ≻ E∗\E(v) ≻ C ≻ p ≻ E(v) ≻ B .
Here E(v) denotes the set of the edges incident to the vertex
v. Let Z denote the set of the voters in these parties.
(2) We have one party P ′ containing n voters with the pref-
erence B ≻ C ≻ p ≻ E∗ ≻ A
and one party P containing one voter with the preference
E∗ ≻ p ≻ A ≻ B ≻ C.
Observe that we have 2n + 1 voters; thus there is no tie.
The initial scores of the candidates, which follow directly
from Table 3, are as follows:
s(p) = |A|+ |B|+ |E∗|
s(ai) = (|A| − 1) + |B|+ |C|
s(bi) = (|B| − 1) + |C|
s(ei) ≤ |A|+ |B|+ |E
∗| − 1
s(ci) ≤ 1 + |E
∗|+ |C| − 1
We are ready to prove the correctness.
(⇒:) Let S be an independent set of size k in G. We
switch all the voters corresponding to the vertices in S from
Z to party P . Since S is an independent set, for every edge
candidate ei, there is at most one voter in S preferring p to
ei. Thus, even after the switching of these voters, p still beats
every candidate ei ∈ E∗ by at least n + 1 voters. Thus, the
score of p remains unchanged. The only candidates, whose
score may increase after the switching of voters, are the can-
didates ei ∈ E∗. A candidate ei can have a score at least
that of p only if ei beats p or some candidate ci. However,
this is impossible, since S is an independent set and ei beats
p and every ci by n− 2 in the original election. Thus p still
remains the unique winner.
(⇐:) Suppose it is possible to switch a set S′ of k voters
to a destination party, such that p still remains the winner.
First observe that P ′ cannot be the destination party, since
otherwise, b1 would replace p as the winner. We distinguish
the following two cases:
Case 1. P is the destination party. Observe that irrespec-
tive of the composition of S′, p still beats all the candidates
in A∪B but none in C. Moreover, no candidate in A∪B∪C
can increase its score. Since p is the unique winner in the fi-
nal election, no voters in S′ come from the party P ′, since
otherwise, some ei would beat p and thus prevent p from
being the unique winner. Therefore, all voters of S′ must be
from Z . More specifically, the vertices corresponding to S′
form an independent set, since otherwise, some edge candi-
date would replace p as the winner.
Case 2. Some party Pv is the destination party. In this
case, no voter of S′ is from P ∪ P ′, since otherwise, since
a1 would prevent p from becoming the winner. Thus, all the
votes of S′ are from the setZ . We claim that the vertices cor-
responding to S′ form an independent set. For contradiction,
assume that this is not true. Then, there must be an edge ei
for which there are two voters in S′ preferring p to ei. Note
that ei /∈ E(v). Therefore, p cannot beat ei, leading to that
p’s score is one less than that of ei in the original election.
Hence, a1 would prevent p from becoming the unique win-
ner, a contradiction.
